Institution-wide discovery
The first run: enumerate everything reachable under the institution's domains and find out how much of it is unrecognised.
A department stood up a project site in 2019. A research group runs its own server. A faculty subdomain points at infrastructure that was decommissioned two years ago. None of it went through central IT, and all of it is reachable.
Start by finding out what you actually have.

Education has an unusual governance problem: the institution is not really one organisation.
Departments and faculties operate with genuine autonomy, and that autonomy extends to technology. A research group procures its own infrastructure. A department launches a conference site. A faculty runs a legacy application because it is the only thing that does what they need. Central IT is frequently informed rather than consulted, and often not informed. The result is an estate assembled by dozens of independent decisions over decades โ with a security team that is small, funded from a squeezed operational budget, and responsible for all of it.
The data is more varied than people assume. Student records, financial aid and payment information, health service data in institutions that run one, HR records, and research data that in some fields is genuinely valuable and in others is subject to grant conditions or export controls.
The user population also turns over almost completely every few years, by design, and includes a substantial cohort who are curious, technically capable, and on the inside of the network.
Decentralised procurement means the security team cannot enumerate its own estate from records. This is the foundational problem and everything else follows from it.
Sites and applications that outlived their owners, their projects and sometimes their departments. Unmaintained, unpatched, still answering.
DNS records pointing at deprovisioned infrastructure. Education estates accumulate these faster than almost any other sector because nothing is ever formally decommissioned.
Departmental systems maintained by one person who left, running on frameworks past support.
A per-engagement consultancy model is simply unaffordable at this estate size, so most of it is never tested.
Grant conditions, export controls and collaboration agreements that impose obligations most security programmes are not built around.
With legitimate internal access and high turnover.
Reconnaissance enumerates subdomains, ports, services and endpoints across the domains you own, and fingerprints versions and frameworks. For an institution that has never had a complete inventory, this run alone tends to justify the exercise.
Discovered assets then receive assessment rather than just enumeration: service and version detection, CVE matching, TLS posture and default credentials on network ranges; application testing on discovered web and API surfaces. The output is not a list of things to worry about, it is a list with the exploitable ones marked.
Orphaned services show up as assets running outdated versions with known CVEs, and validated exploitation distinguishes the genuinely exposed from the merely old. Certificate and TLS posture checks surface the DNS and certificate hygiene issues that underpin takeover risk.
Validation is what separates the two lists a discovery tool usually hands over together. A decade-old conference microsite running an unpatched CMS and a decade-old microsite that is merely old look identical in an inventory. Only one of them is a way in, and the difference is whether the exploit ran.
Assessment cost scales with assets rather than with consultant days, which is what makes covering forty departments a realistic proposition rather than a bid for funding that will not be granted.
That matters most for the departmental estate, where the sites are individually small and collectively the majority of the surface. A per-asset cost lets a research group's site be tested on the same schedule as the student portal, rather than being left out because it could never justify a day of consultancy on its own.
Multi-role authenticated testing across student, staff, faculty and administrative accounts, with cross-access attempted between them. A student reaching another student's record, grades or financial information is the finding that becomes an institutional incident.
The Docker-deployed agent covers internal IP ranges and CIDR blocks with outbound connectivity only. Useful on campus networks that were built for openness.
Every confirmed finding carries the exact request, the response, and a reproducible curl command, plus remediation guidance with vulnerable and secure code examples. When the team is small, triage cost is the binding constraint, and evidence is what removes it.
subdomain and asset enumeration, technology fingerprinting across a decentralised estate.
port, service and version detection, CVE matching, TLS posture, default credentials, across IP ranges and CIDR blocks.
Deployed inside the campus network and reaching out, so nothing has to be opened inbound for it. Port, service and version detection, CVE matching, TLS posture and default credentials across the ranges you declare.
student, staff, faculty, administrator, with cross-access comparison.
IDOR, horizontal and vertical privilege escalation.
REST via OpenAPI or Swagger, GraphQL with introspection, gRPC with proto files.
Student records leak in passing more often than through the endpoint that was meant to return them: an identifier in an error page, a record quoted back in a stack trace.
Quick for breadth across many small sites, Standard for the systems that matter, Deep before an audit.
control mapping for GDPR, ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIST, CIS and PCI DSS, with gap analysis.
The first run: enumerate everything reachable under the institution's domains and find out how much of it is unrecognised.
Identifying and assessing sites and applications with no current owner.
Multi-role testing across student, staff and administrative accounts with cross-access attempted.
Assessment before the intake period, when portal load and attention both peak.
Assessing systems holding data subject to grant conditions or collaboration agreements.
Assessing a departmentally-procured system before it is brought under central IT management.
With discovery. Reconnaissance enumerates subdomains, services and endpoints across the domains you own and fingerprints what responds. Most institutions find assets they did not know were reachable, and that inventory is what makes every subsequent decision possible.
Cost scales with assets rather than consultant days, and Quick mode runs 15โ30 minutes per target, which makes breadth across many small sites practical.
Pricing is outside the scope of this page, but the model matters: because cost tracks assets rather than engagement days, assessing forty departments is not forty engagements.
FERPA is not a documented control mapping. Findings map to GDPR, ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIST, CIS and PCI DSS. Technical testing evidence supports a student-records protection programme, but no testing tool delivers compliance with records legislation on its own.
Only with authorisation. Scope is verified before anything runs, and testing systems you do not own or are not permitted to test is out of the question. In practice, discovery is what identifies departmental systems, and the governance conversation follows from the evidence.
Internal assessment via the Docker-deployed agent covers authorised internal ranges with outbound connectivity only: port and service detection, version detection, CVE matching, TLS posture and default credentials.
Destructive actions are off by default, the request rate is configurable, and out-of-scope paths are respected. Institutions typically avoid assessment windows during examinations and enrolment for operational rather than technical reasons.
Setup is measured in hours, not people. One person supplies the domain and, for authenticated testing, a set of credentials per role; discovery and testing run without supervision from there. The ongoing cost is triage, and that is the part the evidence is designed to remove: every confirmed finding arrives with the request, the response proving it worked and the fix, so the decision is whether to schedule the work rather than whether the finding is real.
Start with discovery across your domains. Then test what matters, at a cost that scales with your estate rather than with consultant days.
Scope verified before any test runs ยท Destructive actions off by default
Same engine, different threat model, different auditor. Each page covers the systems, regulations and attack paths that sector actually lives with.
Payment flows, lending decisions, account servicing, open banking APIs โ the logic that handles money is the logic attackers study hardest. It is also the logic no signature database describes.
ExplorePatient portals, scheduling systems, clinical APIs, payer integrations: all of it holds data that carries a lifetime of consequence if it leaks, and much of it runs on systems that cannot be taken offline for a test.
ExploreBenefits portals, licensing systems, tax filing, records access โ services that must be open to everyone by design, running on estates that were often built decades apart and connected later.
ExploreAlmost nobody breaks into a plant by attacking a controller. They arrive through a corporate account, a supplier portal, an ERP integration or an exposed remote access service, and then walk into a network that was designed for reliability, not for containment.
ExploreThe vulnerabilities that cost retailers money are rarely exotic. A discount that stacks when it should not. A price accepted from the client. A gift card balance that survives a concurrent request. A loyalty account reachable from another customer's session.
ExploreEvery enterprise deal arrives with a questionnaire, a SOC 2 request and someone technical asking when you last tested. Meanwhile you ship on Tuesday and again on Thursday, and the last pentest describes a product that has since changed twice.
ExploreA single authorisation flaw in a subscriber portal is not one exposed account. At operator scale it is a data set โ and the same flaw in a provisioning API is an operational one.
ExploreClients do not retain a firm because of its document management system. They retain it on the assumption that what they share stays privileged โ and increasingly they audit that assumption before instructing.
Explore