Tenant isolation verification.
Accounts in two tenants, cross-access attempted across every resource type, the assessment every multi-tenant product should run continuously.
Every enterprise deal arrives with a questionnaire, a SOC 2 request and someone technical asking when you last tested. Meanwhile you ship on Tuesday and again on Thursday, and the last pentest describes a product that has since changed twice.
Test on your cadence. Answer with evidence.

SaaS has a security problem that is also a revenue problem, and the two are the same conversation.
Multi-tenancy means every customer's data lives in the same system, separated by application logic rather than by physical boundaries. That is an efficient architecture and a concentrated risk: a single authorisation failure does not expose one account, it potentially exposes all of them. Tenant isolation is the one thing that cannot break. At the same time, the sales motion has changed.
Enterprise buyers now run technical due diligence as standard. A questionnaire, a SOC 2 Type II request, evidence of penetration testing, sometimes a call with the prospect's security team. For a growing SaaS company, security has moved from a cost centre to a gate on the pipeline.
And the engineering cadence makes both harder. Continuous deployment means the application that was assessed in March is not the application running in June. A point-in-time report ages in weeks.
Cross-tenant access is the finding that ends companies rather than embarrassing them. It is also structurally hard to test, because it requires holding sessions in two tenants simultaneously and attempting to cross, something single-session scanning cannot do at all.
Roles, permissions, workspaces, projects, shared resources, guest access, API tokens with their own scopes. Every feature adds a permission interaction, and the interactions are where authorisation fails.
Customers integrate directly. Partners build on it. The mobile app uses it. Object-level authorisation across that surface is the dominant risk class, and endpoints that no UI calls are the least likely to have been reviewed.
Weekly or daily releases against annual or quarterly testing.
A prospect asks for evidence, and the answer determines whether the deal progresses this quarter.
A ten-person engineering organisation is asked to demonstrate the security posture of a company ten times its size.
Configure accounts in separate tenants and the agent attempts cross-access. Sessions are maintained across the run, roles are cross-tested against each other, and the finding you want to know about (one tenant reaching another's data) surfaces because both sessions are held at once and compared.
This is the single most important capability on this page. A scanner holding one session cannot find it, which is why it survives in production far longer than it should.
Configure users at each privilege level (owner, admin, member, guest, service token) and the agent cross-tests. IDOR and horizontal and vertical privilege escalation are covered as an access control class, and access control is one of the seven vulnerability classes with 35+ active tests behind it.
Supply an OpenAPI or Swagger specification and every declared endpoint, method and parameter is tested, including the ones no interface calls. GraphQL is supported with schema introspection, gRPC with proto files.
Quick Scans run 15โ30 minutes on pull requests through GitHub Actions, GitLab CI or Jenkins, with the option to fail a build on a severity threshold. SARIF puts findings in the editor and the pull request. Jira and Linear receive tickets; Slack and Teams carry alerts.
Reports export as PDF, HTML, JSON, CSV and SARIF, with control mapping for SOC 2, ISO 27001, GDPR, PCI DSS, NIST and CIS, an executive summary, technical detail and trend comparison against previous assessments.
Retest re-runs the specific exploit. The finding moves to fixed when the attack stops working, with retest history attached, which is exactly the artefact a diligence process wants to see.
Two tenants are held at once and each is pointed at the other's data. Isolation that holds in the query layer and leaks through a reporting endpoint is only visible from that comparison.
Horizontal covers one user reaching a peer's records; vertical covers a member reaching an owner's function. Both are attempted against the roles you configure rather than read off the permission matrix.
Sessions are maintained and re-established as they expire, so a long assessment does not quietly become an unauthenticated one halfway through.
In most SaaS architectures the token is the tenant boundary, which makes a weak secret or an unchecked claim a multi-tenant problem rather than a session one.
Spec-driven, so every declared endpoint is exercised, including the ones no front-end calls and nobody remembers shipping.
A Quick Scan fits inside a pull request, and the threshold decides what fails the build rather than what gets filed for a sprint that keeps moving.
The finding arrives where the fix happens. A vulnerability that has to be copied out of a PDF is a vulnerability that waits.
Trial extensions, seat counts, plan downgrades and usage limits are all enforced in application logic, which is exactly the class no signature matches.
The evidence an enterprise deal asks for, produced by testing you were running anyway rather than assembled in the week the questionnaire arrives.
A finding closes when the exploit stops working, and the record of who accepted what, and when, is still there for the audit that asks about it two quarters later.
Accounts in two tenants, cross-access attempted across every resource type, the assessment every multi-tenant product should run continuously.
A prospect asks for evidence of testing. Run a Standard assessment, export the report, attach the control mapping.
Deep assessment with control mapping and retest history for the evidence pack.
Quick Scan on every PR, build fails on critical, everything else becomes a ticket.
Roles or sharing rules changed, verifying the new model holds across every combination.
Spec-driven assessment of every declared endpoint before customers start building on it.
Yes, and it is the reason multi-account configuration exists. Set up accounts in separate tenants, and the agent attempts cross-access while holding both sessions. Cross-tenant findings only surface when a tool can compare what two identities reach. A single-session scanner is structurally incapable of finding them.
Quick Scans run 15โ30 minutes and are built for a pull-request gate. Standard assessments run against release candidates, Deep runs before an audit or a major release. Findings arrive as SARIF in the pull request and as tickets in Jira or Linear.
Reports include an executive summary, technical detail, remediation guidance with code examples, control mapping for SOC 2, ISO 27001, GDPR, PCI DSS, NIST and CIS, and trend comparison against previous assessments, in PDF, HTML, JSON, CSV and SARIF.
Findings map to SOC 2 controls with control assessment and gap analysis in reports, and retest history evidences remediation. That supports a SOC 2 programme, the certification itself involves organisational controls well beyond application testing.
It improves coverage significantly, because a spec declares endpoints no interface calls and those are the least-tested part of most APIs. Without one, testing works from the base URL and endpoints discovered in traffic and client bundles.
Yes. That is what the Quick tier is for. It covers the OWASP Top 10, exposed services, known CVEs and misconfiguration, and explicitly does not attempt business logic or chain testing, because that needs session state and time. Depth goes on release candidates instead.
As authentication types. Bearer tokens and custom header schemes are supported, and tokens can be configured as separate identities with their own roles, which means a token's effective scope can be tested rather than trusted.
By testing with accounts you provision for it. The agent works as the identities you supply, creates its own records where it can, and prefers proving access by reading a single object over modifying anything. Where a cross-tenant check does reach another tenant's data, that is the finding, and the returned values are redacted in the report rather than stored.
Tenant isolation, authorisation and API coverage, on your release cadence, with evidence you can forward to a prospect.
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